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O R I G I N A L

£1
1
2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

3

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4

6

SCOTT GOURDIN, a minor, by and
through his Guardian ad Litem
WAYNE C. CLOSE,

7

Plaintiff,

5

Civil No. CV-86-1772

8

vs.

TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL

9

SHARON'S CULTURAL EDUCATIONAL
RECREATIONAL ASSOCIATION
(SCERA), et al.,

(VOL. Ill of 3

10
11

)

Defendants.

12
13

BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled

14

matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable

15

Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge of the above-entitled Court,

16

sitting with a jury, on the 6th, 7th and 8th days of August,

17

1990, at Room 310, County Courthouse Building, 51 South

18

University Avenue, Provo, Utah, 84601;

19

That there appeared as counsel represent-

20

ing plaintiff, BRENT D. YOUNG, ESQ., and as counsel repre-

21

senting defendant, RICHARD K. GLAUSER, ESQ.

22
23
24
25

WHEREFORE, the following proceedings
were had, continuing from Vol. II page 399:

1

you 1 d let me

—

2

THE COURT:

All right, ladies and gentle-

3

men, counsel wants to make some motions, legal arguments to

4

the Court.

5

done.

6

cuss the case among yourselves, permit anyone to discuss the

7

case with you or in any way attempt to enhance your infor-

8

mation concerning this matter except as it has come to you in

9

the courtroom.

10
11
12

We'll ask that you step out while that's being

Again, while we are not assembled, please do not dis-

So if the jury will step down, we'll call you

back as soon as we can.
(WHEREUPON, the Jury exited the courtroom at 9:45
o'clock a.m.)

13

THE COURT:

14

MR GLAUSER:

15

All right, Mr. Glauser.
Your Honor, at this time the

defense would move for a summary judgment on several grounds.

16

The first ground being that this action is barred

17

by the Exclusive Remedies Provisions of the Workers Compen-

18

sation statute, Utah Code Section 35-1-60.

19

your Honor, that 11 of the elements have been met, if in fact

20

Scott Gourdin is found to be any type of staff member or

21

authorized worker at Scera.

22

we are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

23

It's our position,

And based on that, we believe

The other alternative to that is that Scott was not

24

acting in any authorized capacity.

And if that is the truth,

25

it would be our position that we owed no duty as a matter of

1

law to Scott Gourdin; that respondeat superior cannot be

2

applicable, and we would be entitled to judgment as a matter

3

of law in that regard.

4

I would also move for summary judgment based on

5

the ground that there is no duty owed to a volunteer worker

6

except to refrain from intentionally injuring him, and in

7

the case of volunteer workers, respondeat superior does not

8

apply.

9

Finally, I would move, if in fact Scott is not

10

within the authorized authority of Scera, he would be in

11

effect a trespasser to the lawnmower, and as such there would

12

be no duty except to refrain from intentionally and willfully

13

injuring him.

14

I have several cases that are on point with regard

15

to the duty that!s owed to a volunteer.

16

to, I'd be happy to refer to those, your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. GLAUSER:

If you f d like me

You may do what you wish.
First of all, there's a

19

case of Hall vs. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, in

20

349 F.Supp 326.

That f s a case out of the District Court of

21

Kansas in 1972.

And there they found that a trucking company

22

had rules prohibiting passengers from riding with the drivers.

23

The driver ignored that rule and allowed a passenger to ride

24

along.

And they held there is no duty as far as the trucking

25 I company except to refrain from intentionally and willfully

1
2

injuring the rider.
I would also refer to the case of Pratt vs. Common-

3

wealth Edison Company.

That's a case out of Illinois in 1985

4

The cite on that is 211 NE 2.d 720.

5

the rule that there can be no duty on the part of an owner

6

except to refrain from intentionally and willfully injuring

7

the person.

That case also found

8

I'd also refer the Court to 53 Am Jur 2.d, Section

9

179, which recognizes the rule that with regard to voluntary

10

workers there is no duty at all except to refrain from inten-

11

tionally and willfully harming them.

12

There are several other cases.

I would cite the

13

Court to Henry Wamwald Lumber and Perse Manufacturing Company^

14

Ambersant Manufacturing Company vs. Hayes, decision reported

15

at 291 SW 982, which also stands for the same proposition.

16

The case of in Chicago vs. Enarge, 82 Illinois Appeals, 367.

17

MR. YOUNG:

18

MR. GLAUSER:

367?
Yes.

And also the case

19

which held specifically, in that case they held specifically

20

respondeat superior does not apply in situations like this.

21

There are several others.

22

Bogart vs. Hester, 347 P.2d 327.

23

Company, 140 SE 2.d 99.

24

take the time to go through all of them.

25

standing of the law.

Barber vs. Rich, 90 SE 2.d 666.
Higgins vs. D&F Electric

There are many many more.

I won't

But that's my under•[

1

With regard to workers compensation, I think the

2

courts have recognized that there are four prongs that must

3

be met before the Workers Compensation Exclusive Remedies

4

Provision is in effect.

5

The first one if that there must be an exercise of

6

control over the employee.

7

by the testimony of Paul Gourdin.

8

the contrary.

9

That's clearly been established
There is no evidence to

Second of all, there must be a right, not neces-

10

sarily exercised, a right to hire and fire.

11

was acting within his scope, which we deny, certainly he had

12

that right.

13

Third.

If in fact he

There must be some compensation.

And the

14

courts have held that it does not necessarily have to be pay-

15

ment of money, but it can be other sources of compensation.

16

And I think there's ample evidence that if in fact he was a

17

staff member, which we deny, he would have received certain

18

considerations such as the use of the pool, et cetera, those

19

kinds of things.

20

Finally, the fourth prong is that there be some

21

furnishment of equipment in cases such as this.

And certainly]

22

if he was within the scope, the equipment was furnished.

23

Second of all, besides the summary judgment motion

24

in favor of Seera, we would move for summary judgment on our

25

claim for comparative negligence.

We think there is ample

1

evidence in the record.

2

the record to indicate that Scott was trained and taught and

3

did not comply with the training and teaching that he had.

4

There's testimony in the record that his capacity was some-

5

where between nine and ten years of age.

6

There is no contrary evidence in

Also we would move for summary judgment on any wage

7

loss for future, I don't know that they are claiming a wage

8

loss, but any future loss of earnings, there simply just isn f t|

9

any evidence in the record to support any of that.

10

It would

be based solely on speculation, if there were any award.
And finally, w e f d move for summary judgment against

11
12

on the issue of negligence of Toro and Cutler's.

13

under the theory of warranty of fitness for a particular pur-

14

pose, which I think the evidence is clearly established.

15

Toro for not putting safety features on commercial lawnmowers

16

in 1985.

17

22

THE COURT:

Do you wish to be heard, Mr.

MR. YOUNG:

Does the court wish to hear

THE COURT:

What do you have to say about

Young?

20
21

And

Thank you, your Honor.

18
19

Cutler's

me 7

23 | Workmens Compensation Statute.

24
25

MR. YOUNG:

Judge, there's a Utah case on

that, and I have been trying to find it, and I've read it,

1

And I can't, I'm not putting my hand on it.

And it is not

2

a -- It's not indexed where I should have it in my file,

3

and I'm not finding it, judge.

4

it-

5

Salt Lake School Districts,

But I'm not concerned about

I think it involves a board of education in one of the

6

And I can't find it right now.

MR. GLAUSER:

Your Honor, I think the

7

case counsel is looking for is Board of Education of Alpine

8

School District vs. Olson, which is reported at 684 P.2d 49,

9

1984 case.

10

MR. YOUNG:

That sounds right, and I've

11

got it marked, and I had something I wanted to point out to

12

the Court, but I don't, I'm not putting my finger on it.

13

That's 684?

14
15

MR. GLAUSER:

18

I'd be happ)]

to let you look at mine, counsel.

16
17

Yes, 684 P. 2d.

MR, YOUNG:
got mine all marked out, too.

I'm not finding mine,

I've

Thank you.

Your Honor, in this case, if I can find it, judge,

19

I'd like to find my notes on that, and I can't find the thing

20

that I'm looking for.

21

I'm not putting the my finger on what I want.

22

would really like to hear from me on that, I'd like to be

23

heard, and I'd like to be able to spend a minute or two and

24

go through my file.

25

I'm embarrassed, but that's, I'm not,

THE COURT:

If the Court

Well, I'll give you a few

1

minutes to look for them.

I'm concerned about it, Mr. Young.

2

MR. YOUNG:

Thanks.

3

THE COURT:

Your theory is that he's an

5

MR. YOUNG:

Pardon me?

6

THE COURT:

Isn't your theory that he is

4

7

employee.

an employee or in that category?

8
9

MR. YOUNG:

Well, as we discussed yester-

day, he's not a paid employee, and yet he's not really a

10

strictly volunteer.

11

someone that comes and does work that isn't compensated and

12

paid for it, but yet there are certain benefits like going to

13

the movies or going swimming and using the facilities.

14

really doesn't come under either category, in the traditional

15

sense.

16

He is a, in the traditonal sense, he's

THE COURT:

Well, you find me something

17

that says that, Mr. Young, if you've got something.

18

take a short recess, and see what you can find.

19

So he

We'll

(WHEREUPON, the Court recessed, and reconvened

20

again shortly thereafter, continuing outside the presence of

21

the Jury, as follows:)

22
23
24 I

25

THE COURT:
gentlemen.

Please be seated, ladies and

We'll continue with Gourdin v s . Scera.
Mr. Young?
MR. YOUNG:

Thank you, your Honor.

Your

1

Honor, I don't have an extra copy of this case for the Court,

2

but I understand counsel does have an extra copy.

3

THE COURT:

Well, I've read it.

4

MR- YOUNG:

Okay.

5

THE COURT:

I assume you are talking aboutj

6

the Board of Education case.

7

MR. YOUNG:

Yes.

Then let me just, if

8

the Court has had an opportunity to read it, then just let

9

me summarize it as I understand it.

It was an appeal from

10

the Industrial Commission on a given set of facts which

11

weren't disputed.

12

Olson who was a carpenter and a contractor and had his own

13

residential construction business.

14

enrolled in a wood shop class at Mountainview.

15

shop teacher if he could come during school hours and use the

16

equipment.

17

continued to work on his personal project.

18

participating in a retired senior volunteer program, which wasj

19

a county-sponsored program.

20

relationship with the, that program, and but when Olson was

21

interviewed by the officials of Mountainview, it was pretty

22

clear that at the interview that he would be acting as a

23

volunteer in the wood shop class.

24

express writing or oral contract with for employment with the

25

district, and he didn't receive any wage or monetary remunera-j

And there was a fellow by the name of

And in 1980 and '18, he

The shop teacher agreed.

He asked the

Later on in '81 as, he
And then he began

And the school district had a

and he did not have an

1

tion for his services, and he didn't have any expectation of

2

being paid for the assistance of classroom.

3

spending the day as a substitute teacher, for which he was

4

paid.

5

Leter on he ended]

Now, the issue before the Court in that case was

6

whether the claimant Olson was a volunteer or an employee for

7

the purposes of Workmens Compensation benefits.

8

trative law judge found that he was a volunteer and said he

9

was entitled to benefits, and he reasons by analogies from a

An adminis-

10

firemans statute.

11

was, I think they used was "patently incorrect.ff

12

in the middle of the page, on page 5, the Workmens Compensa-

13

tion.

14

mens compensation," saying "workmens compensation is a purely

15

statutory creation.

16

subjects not included in the provisions."

17

And then says, it does not include volunteers.

18

tells that a volunteer, such as Olson, is not eligible for

19

workmens compensation under Utah law.

20

And the Supreme Court said that his ruling
Yes, right

And then the Court went on to say, and I quote:

ff

Work-|

This Court cannot expand the statutes

Our case is a little different.

Cites some cases.
And then it

Going to page 50,

21

Olson testified that it was clear at the interview that he would

22

be acting as a volunteer in a workshop class.

23

here is a young man who is cutting lawns for Scera, and in

24

exchange for cutting lawns and doing other things he gets

25

to go into the movie theater and gets to go swimming, gets to

What we have

1

use the facility.

2

express"written or oral contract of employment with the

3

school or the district.

4

Not quite the same.

Olson did not have an

Well, Scott didn't have an express written contract\

5

but then neither did Paul Carter, who was working there and

6

apparently -- Olson did not receive any wage or monetary

7

remuneration for his services.

8

either.

9

ity, as I've mentioned.

In a pure sense, Scott didn't

He received the opportunity to go and use the facilSo I don't think that under the

10

Workmens Compensation Act that workmens compensation is his

11

exclusive remedy.

12

remedy under the act.

Because he wouldn't qualify for that

13

THE COURT:

Well, either he's an employee

14

or in that status or he's not, Mr. Young.

15

You say he's a hybrid.

16

no business being there and not acting within the scope.

17

Talking about the master's business.

18

have to be there?

19

He's not.

MR. YOUNG:

He's a volunteer, and has

What business does he

The evidence is that Scera

20

used volunteers to mow lawns.

21

He mowed lawns.

22

ently that was their practice.

23

was their practice.

24

were involved in that practice.

25

Isn't that correct^

Paul Carter was a volunteer.

And Scera benefitted from that.

And appar-

There is evidence that that

You've heard firsthand from people who

THE COURT:

Well, Section 35-1-43, where

1

in the finding, M An employee under the Workmen's Compensation

2

I ,aw,"

3

employer."

4

and that defines an employer.

5

that there i s ai i) • questioi I bi it what tl le Seer a qua! if y as an

6

employer.

7

regularly JLH the <^ime business <-*

8

lishmen

9

or implied, oral

says:

"An employee is each person in the service of anjj
And that f s defined ii i Section 35, Sectioi i ] 24,
Doesn't appear to the Court

"Who employes one or more workers or operatives
if

,, ; ; <

oral m

* • »• <if

f

"»«> s/*r:>- » - *i •

-. '

. ,

written, including aliens and minoiN.

10

W'-i* 1 \

ll

ding any person whose employment is casual and whose employ-

12

ment

13

«il r h e

-

Liegaily working for hi re,

but not JLUClu-

whose employment is casual and not in the usual cours^
i i ifjf

(

\wv\ i IH'SS "i ncoupat ion nj hi1' nnplnvt-'i ."

14

Why doesn't, i f your position is so, that he i s not

15

a, why doesn't your, why doesn't Scott qualify as an employee

16

under that definition?

17

MR,, YOUNG:

He's ',,.f p;, \ d.

18

THE COURT:

w e n , there's no question

but what he gets remuneration

20

ticket, Iii those days, I don't know what they are now, they

21

are rather hi gli,

22

would go to the movie: wouldn" 1: that be compensation?

23

the difference between that and being admitted to the movie

24

without charge?

25

Supposing I £ he got

he

19

maybe $5 00 ; say tl iey

MR. YOUNG.

movie

ai : e $2 00 and that lie
What's

Trie difference is, I s that he

1

wouldn't qualify to make a claim against the Industrial Com-

2

mission.

3

That's not the type of -THE COURT:

Why wouldn't he.

I think

4

the part of the decision in the Board of Education case you'v^

5

cited was that, first of all, that the compensation for the

6

meal ticket wasn't paid by the school district, it was paid

7

by, is paid by the RSCV, or whatever it is.

8

MR. YOUNG:

Correct.

9

THE COURT:

So this is a distinguishing

10

feature.

Secondly, under the Board of Education case, the

11

School District had no right to determine his hours.

12

had no supervision over him.

13

his own considerably, for his own individual purposes of his

14

business.

15

that, if I understand your testimony that's come in, that the

16

agent of the employer, Scera, Paul Gourdin had certainly the

17

power and the authority and did exercise determination of

18

hours, when he worked.

They

And he was operating there undeif

And none of those aspects apply here.

You agree

19

MR. YOUNG:

That's true.

20

THE COURT:

Directed his work, told them

21

what to do, when to do it.

Seems to me that that Board of

22

Education case is substantially different from the one that

23

we have before us now.

24

Paul Gourdin, acting with the course and scope of his employ-

25

ment, hired or employed, permitted, Scott to work; directed

Your allegation is that the, that

1

h i s a c t i v i t i e s , told h i m w h e n to w o r k , c e r t a i n l y c a r r i e s <i 11

2

of t h e z\ laracteri sti cs o f i " ' , "T> "' *v< ' ' •,r' 'v* * '
* * "* 1 ie qi les

3

of c o m p e n s a t i o n o f w h e t h e r - r n o : the right

4

a n d t h e r i g h t to g o to a v>-—-Le c o n s t i t u t e s

5

within the meaning of the Act,

6

compensation

A n d t h e B o a r d o f E d u c a t i o n case doesn't

7

w r i th that except to say t:l lat 1:1 lei: e w a si i

8

a l .•!" ^ - : .->*' n e c a u s e t h e m e a i

9

'. r eo swimming

: t h e h'^T'i

ti,«vt

' E d u c a t i o n case. *!-•*>
•

really deal
•. *

that t h e in^:iv%:

«: t i c k e t w a s p r o v i d e d

10

• >r

.

11

n o t p r o v i d e d b y t h e B o a r d o f E d u c a t i o n b u t w a s provi cieci by

12

"he other entity, the RS V'P, what is it, is that what it's

13 I

called?

14

MR. YOUNG:

Ri gh/1 :

15

THE COUR T :

Sc 1 .1 i< it < i] e a r ] y I i i 1 .1 :ii, U

c :ia se

16

they distinguish i t and say there wasn't any compensation of

17

any kind.

18

MR , YOUNG:

Wo I I

1 d o n " I t h i ilk t h i s

is

19

the kind of compensation that the Industrial Commission would

20

recogni ze

21

THE COURT:

S u p p o s i n g that h e is covered

22

b y W o r k m e n ' s C o m p e n s a t i o n , M r . G l a u s e r , h o w w o ^ l d rh« # •*•

23

determined for the pi it poses o f awardd i ig coiiipo;

24

responsibilities under the Workmens Compensation Act?

25

•'

hAUSER:

.

As ; I i inderstand i 1

• UP-.

yoi lr

1

Honor, the Workmens Compensation laws provide for specific

2

compensation based on specific impairment.

3

for payment of medical bills.

4

claim had probably been submitted to the Workmens Compensation)

5

Commission, and perhaps it still can; Scottfs still a minor,

6

and I don f t know if the statute would be tolled, it's obvious-|

7

ly run, unless it is tolled.

8

the Workmens Compensation Commission minds, I think:

9

They would pay his medical bills.

They also provide

What that means is, if this

But his claim, if submitted to
No. 1.

No. 2, based on impairment

10

for specific amputations, he would be awarded a certain lump

11

sum, as set by the statute.

12
13

There are no, with regard to lost wages, I don't
know how they would handle that, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

I suppose --

Well, describes, "Average

15

weekly earnings shall mean the average weekly earnings arrived]

16

at by the rules provided in Section 35-1-75."

17

average weekly earnings are whatever the value of the right

18

to be admitted to the movie and to the swimming pool.

19
20

What's that case you had that indicated that?

MR. GLAUSER:

To about what the compens-

ation has to be, your Honor?

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. GLAUSER:

25

You

cited one, as I recall, in reference to compensation.

21
22

Suppose the

a couple --

Yes.
I would refer the Court to

1
2

THE COURT:
one?

3

4

MR

I think.

I • 1< :»i: i , t , yoiii ' H< >n< u

GI I A U S E R :

ti« -* h o n e s t w i t h you,

5

1 don't

fllah

6

ring to was dicta,

7

mention to the Court thai •

8
9

Well , have you got a copy of

know t h a i

I liiinl

I woul d just

Why ilnri' f

the other podium.

10

MR, GLAUSER:

That the Workmens Compens-

11

ation Statute has always been interpreted broac.

12

many cases saying that it

13

i

14

compensation.

15
16

19

there 1

o-<* ire

question, :f generally

*

Specifically, the case <T Ortega vs. Salt -ake WetWash, which is reported, ] 56 P .2- <-

17
18

ch* r r -

w h a t , JL w a s L t s i . e r -

Let me 1 ind that tor you

THE COURT:

* i

THE COURT:

~ understand that con™

cept.
\ -,,

Won hi i he (!our I be inclined

20

|-o take this under advisement and let me take a look at: a

21

couple of nthiM' JSSUP.S in l lit1 interim?

22

MR. GLAUSER:

By the way, your Honor,

23

apparently you are not concerned with this, but there was

24

some question as to an agreement, in the case of Bambra v s .

25

Bethers, which is found in 552 P. 2d 1286.

The court said thatl

1

the Workmens Compensation Act does not expressly require con-

2

sent on employer's part to establish requisite employer-

3

employee relationship, nor is written contract required for-

4

mality for Workmens Compensation purposes.

5
6

THE COURT:

Well, I don't have any ques-

tion about that either oral or written, express or implied.

7

What points do you think you can address, Mr. Young?

8

MR. YOUNG:

I want to be satisfied in my

9

mind, your Honor, that there isn't a, and I understand that

10

there is and I don't want to represent to the Court, it runs

11

in my mind that there's a very, a more recent case which

12

discussed assertions or immunities, and I'd like to have that

13

opportunity to take a look at that, which I could do during

14

the noon hours.

15

nesses out in the hall.

I know that Mr. Glauser has a bunch of wit-

16

MR. GLAUSER:

Your Honor, I don't believe

17

that that, other than the dicta that you found that you read,

18

had the Board of Education talking about the meal ticket, and

19

I think and I know there's a dicta case where they use the

20

word "wage or other consideration or compensation," or some-

21

thing like that,

22

on it.

23

uage was germane to the holding of the case.

24
25

but I'm having trouble putting my fingers

But I'll be honest with you, I don't think that lang-

But, your Honor, as I see this it's a, yes, it's a
win-win situation.

If workmens Compensation is applicable,

If it's not applicable, it f s because he was

1

they are barred.

2

n o t r e c o gi 11 z e d a s ai 1 emp 1 o y e e . / u H J i\i\ s 11 c 11, S * • ij r r i o w f • i 1 m i

3

duty to h i m except to r e f r a i n from w i l l f u l l y and intentionally

4

Lng h i m , u n d e r the c a s e s .

5

The duty to refrain from injuring employees arises

6

at law from the e m p l o y m e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p .

7

is

8

r e l a t i o n s h i p , they c e r t a i n l y can 1 !: b e held :• * ^

9

and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of i t . W h e t h e r h e ' s w i t h i n < r w h e t h e r

* *

If that relationship)

, Scei a I s i Iot ei 11:i 11 eci tc 11: Ie benefI ts of that

10

he's without, ei tl: ler wa

11

is e n t i t l e d to j u d g m e n t .

12

*•<•'>*.

; a matter of 1

THE COURT:

obligations

: t

W e l l , r L U J L U K your m o t i o n is

13

not properly identified.

It isn't a motion for summary judg-

14

m e n t , p r o b a b l y m o r e properlv a m o t i o n for a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t .

15

ME

••-'••

16

THE COURT:

•

: -.

I don't think 11. * s , ,: summary

17

j u d g m e n t is a p p r o p r i a t e at this point

18

has rested 1 lis case.

19

c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the m o t i o n is c r i t i c a l , since it's obvious)

20

that's w h a t your intetiL JLS .
¥v

21
22

So that, b-

GLAUSER:

think the ; l a i n t i f f
-

: • •

:

M^

I'd be happy to amend it,

your Honor, to clarify that that's what it meant.

23

T H E COI IF I:

W e l l , Mi

24

p o s e I've g o t to rule on this m a t t e r b e f o r e w e p r o c e e d .

25

£s

one

question.

oThere)

1

There isn't any evidence in the record, Mr. Glauser,

2

that Scera in fact carried Workmens Compensation.

3

they did not, and then even if he were an employee, they'd

4

have a direct right of action against the, against Scera, so

5

that there's that deficiency in the record, as to whether or

6

not there's any Workmens Compensation coverage, or whether

7

it was maintained prior by Scera.

8
9
10
11

If in fact

I

Well, I'm going to take the matter under advisement.
We'll proceed from this point to the noon hour, will not permit you to do that.
I do feel that in any event, Mr. Young, that there

12

is a complete failure of proof as to any future loss of earn-

13

ings, and I think that the defendant is entitled to a directed]

14

verdict as to that issue

15

As to the comparative negligence issue, if we get

16

to that point, it isn't handled on some other basis, it appearjs

17

to the Court that is a jury question.

18

can decide that.

19

MR. YOUNG:

I don't think the Court|

When you say that the, you

20

are going to direct a verdict on those future lost earnings,

21

do I understand that you are going to instruct the jury that

22

there will be no loss, future lost earnings?

23

stand your ruling to be that I will not be able to argue that

24

he will have --

25

THE COURT:

Or do I under-

Well, there isn't any proof,

1

there isn't anything in the record of future lost e a r n i n g s

2

that" s I: eei 1 admi tted 1 nto e v i dence

3

MR. YOUNGi

That' s true.

4

THE COURT:

So that as to that, it's

5

got to fai 1

Pain and. suffering, those art' still

6
7

MR. YOUNG:
I

'

•

•

viable.

Loss of o p p o r t u n i t y , loss

• . ' ?

8

THE C O U R T :

T h e r e isn't any, to end up

9

w i t h a m o n e t a r y e q u i v a l e n t , there's n o t h i n g on w h i c h the jury

10

could b a s e any decision or findlrig as I o thai

11

that that's a v i a b l e issue.

12

.

13

t r o u b l e , 1 et m e press the Court on the m a t t e r , ,so 1 <lnn'f

14

get in trouble b e f o r e the jury.

15

mony that he w:i 1 1 be i iiipai red. i i i. cei tad n CJCCI lpatd ons

16

that he m a y h a v e d i f f i c u l t y competing w i t h h i s peers in

17

certain occupations.

18

MR. YOUNG:

THE fintlRI-

But there is abundant t e s t i -

as to w h a t that m e a n s m o n e t a r i l y , M r . Y o u n g .

20

yc

21

s p e c u l a t i o n on the part of the jury.

23
24
25

_L is to s p e c u l a t e .

MR. YOUNG:

a nd

Km. there isn'i any cM/idenee

19

22

IS i II f.:hi nk

The only w a y

it w o u l d be a b s o l u t e

Are you p r e c l u d i n g m e from
*i ; -^'}

argu-.n.
THE C O U R T :

L-> - he e x t e n t that y o u are

c l a i m i n g a n y t h i n g for future lost e a r n i n g s or ability to earn J

1

there isn't anything in the record to support it; and to

2

answer your question, yes-

3

your case to the pain and suffering that he's undergone, what

4

he might experience in the future by way of pain and suffer-

5

ing, and the medical expenses that are incurred in connection

6

with these, with the injury.

7

Seems to me you are limited in

MR. YOUNG:

Why can't I refer to Mrs.

8

Farnsworth's testimony to the effect that there are many

9

jobs in the market which will not be available to him, with-

10

out referring to a dollar value?

11
12

THE COURT:
of that, then, Mr. Young?

13
14

MR. YOUNG:

THE COURT:

16

argument that he is.

17

it?

18

20

The purpose of that would be

to show that he is limited in his access to certain jobs.

15

19

What would be the purpose

Let's admit for the sake of

Then what's the jury going to do about

MR. YOUNG:

Well, that's a fact question

THE COURT:

But what, on what could they

for the jury.

21

base any kind of an award?

What evidence is there in the

22

record to support any award of any amount?

23

admit for the sake of argument that he's going to be, have

24

difficulty in certain jobs, that he may not be able to perforr^

25

one or more of them as efficiently as he might otherwise do.

So that, let's

MR. YOUNG:

1

Or he might not be able to

2

compete with another person on an equal footing to get that

3

job.
THE COURT:

4

May not.

But, again, on what
nr the jury to do

5

basis then is there evidence in the reoo:

6

anything except speculate as to what that means in a monetar>

7

sense?

8

they can do is award him compensation.

9

some basis upon which the jury can do that.

They can't distort things -- award compensat
But there's got i. •<

10

MR. YOUNG:

W«

I understand.

11

THE COURT:

And . :\ the absence of any

12

evidence as to a monetary loss or consideration, there's no-

13

thing that the jury can even talk about except to speculate

14

and say, well, he's going to be --

15
16

MR. YOUNG:

Well, I understand.

that's why we had Mrs. Farnsworth here.

And I understand the

Court's ruling with respect to her testimony and the Court,

18
*

„ preclusion of me from having her offer her opinion as to
what those dollar values would be.

And of course when I

couldn't get that in, lay the foundation there, then of course
21

there was no point in calling

22

do is to send him home.

23

THE COURT:

'

Randle, the only thing to

I understand that, Mr. Young.

24

I told you, I'm concerned about the matter, I made my judg-

25

ment, that is the ruling that the law required me to make.

1
2

MR. YOUNG:

Well, I'll not argue with the

THE COURT:

But having made that, and

Court on that.

3
4

that being now the status of the case, it doesnft appear to

5

me that there is any reason for you to argue that he will

6

not be able to compete in the job market in the future, that

7

he will not be able to keep up with his peers in certain

8

respects.

9

of that is true and established, again, what does it mean?

And, admitting for the sake of argument that all

10

The only thing the jury could do is to award him compensation

11

for that: figure.

12

damages cannot be based upon speculation, there has to be

13

some basis or evidence in the record to support whatever they

14

might do in that regard.

15

have to be purely speculation on their part as to what that

16

means.

17

And the Court will instruct the jury that

And there isn't anything.

They'd

So to the extent that that, within that context

18

the Court, the Court would preclude you and expect you not

19

to argue those matters to the jury.

20

that you'd have the permanent injury, and there may be some

21

discomfort and pain that he's going to experience in the

22

future.

23

thing that, again, they just have to fix, since there isn't

24

any measure for that in any event.

25

no expert can get up and say how much it costs to be hurt

Certainly, it's obvious

They may consider that, and obviously that is some-

No testimony can tell,

1

or how much it hurts, how much it's worth to have a finger

2

pain.

3

say that he's not going to be able to compete in the market

4

or he's going to lose job opportunities; those items which

5

can be reduced to a monetary figure and need to be based upon

6

some evidence in the record, of which there is none.

7

the Court would preclude you from doing that.

8
9

But that was a little different matter than trying to

So

But as to the other issue, let's proceed, bring
the jury back in.

I'll deny, just take that motion under

10

advisement, deny it pro forma, then permit you to renew it

11

after the recess.

12

to -- here.

13

I want to give Mr. Young the opportunity

And I'll tell you what I'm concerned about, Mr.

14

Young.

Whether or not the emoluments that have been indicate^

15

would constitute compensation within the meaning of the Act.

16

And since I think all of the other elements are present, if

17

in fact he was hired by his father on behalf of Scera, his

18

father had the right to exercise control, he had the right

19

to fire, he had the right to and did furnish equipment; the

20

only thing that's left is, was there any compensation.

21

what's bothering me.

that 1 ^

22

Just bring the jury back in.

23 J

(WHEREUPON, the Jury returned into the courtroom

24
25

at 10:49 o'clock p.m.)
THE COURT:

Let the record show that the

1

BY MR. GLAUSER:

2

Q

3

application wasn't submitted?

4

that?

5

A

6

deposition, and the facts may be a little fuzzy right now,

7

but it's my recollection at this time that Paul Gourdin said

8

not to do it.

9

Mr. Nielsen, would you tell the jury why that
Do you remember who requested

I think, I think that matter was discussed at my

MR. GLAUSER:

No more questions.

10

THE COURT:

Anything further, Mr. Young?

11

MR. YOUNG:

No, sir.

12

THE COURT:

All right, step down.

13

MR. GLAUSER:

14

anything further at this time.

15

THE COURT:

16

Your Honor, I don't have

All right, Mr. Young, do you

have anything further at this moment?

17

MR. YOUNG:

No, sir.

18

THE COURT:

All right, let's be in recess,

19

let's, perhaps you can try to reconvene without the jury at

20

12:45, so that we don't need to keep the jury waiting any

21

longer than necessary.

22

So, we'll be in recess.

(WHEREUPON, the Court recessed at approximately

23

11:40 o'clock a.m. and reconvened at 1:01 o'clock p.m., con-

24

tinuing outside the presence of the Jury, as follows:)

25

THE COURT:

We'll continue with Gourdin

1

vs. Scera.

2

MR. YOUNG:

Your Honor, may I move this?

3

THE COURT:

Yes.

4

MR. YOUNG:

Right dead in my way.

5

I want to thank the Court for the opportunity to

6

take a little time to look at this.

And I think I can and

7

am in a position to enlighten the Court.

8

by just quickly reviewing the, I think what we have been

9

doing up until now is we have been examining this Workmens

And let me start

10

Compensation issue.

And by the way, your Honor, I have asked

11

Mr. Jeff Peatross, a member of our organization, to sit with

12

me here.

13

turn and ask him a question, if the Court would permit him

14

to sit with me for a moment.

He f s had this issue many times before, and I may

15

THE COURT:

He may.

16

MR. YOUNG:

But up until now we have

17

argued the question, seems to me we have taken it from this

18

point of view:

19

benefit.

20

and the assumption that we've made is that or the underlying

21

assumption that seems to be made is that if he's entitled to

22

benefits, then he could not bring an action because his

23

exclusive remedy would be under the Workmens Compensation

24

Act.

25

Is Scott entitled to Workmens Compensation

We've looked at the Board of Education Alpine case,

Now, I think that analysis, and I'm confident that

1

that analysis is misplaced.

2

for awhile and that may have been true until about 1975.

3

But at that time the Legislature enacted 35-1-62,

4

second paragraph of 35-1-62 provides, if you are with me on

5

that:

6

the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or

7

his heirs or personal representatives may also bring an actioi^

8

for damages against sub-contractors, general contractors,

9

independent contractors, property owners, or their lessees

10

or assigns, not occupying an employee-employer relationship

11

with the injured or deceased employee at the time of his

12

injury or death."

13

Now, that may have been true

Now, the

f,

For the purpose of this Section, and notwithstanding

Now, the Utah State Supreme Court has addressed

14

this question.

15

copy of the case to the Court, of Pate vs. Marathon Diesel

16

Company, found at 777 Pacific Reporter Second at page 428.

17

It's a June 6, 1989 case.

18

sel.

19

page 431 where it provides, the phrase reading, quote:

20

withstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-4 means in oppos-

21

ition to and not incompatibility with Section 35-1-42."

22

And I cite to the Court, and I furnished a

I furnished a copy of it to coun-

And I direct the Courtfs attention to the language on

Now, the Court went on to say, quote:

"Not

"We, there-

23

fore, conclude that the legislature has in clear and unmis-

24

takable language evidenced an intention to allow suit by an

25

injured worker against those persons who might be his or her

1

statutory employer as defined in Section 35-1-42.

2

ate or common law employer who actually pays compensation,

3

and it's officers, agents and employees are shielded by the

4

exclusive remedy immunity covered by Section 35-1-60."

5

The immedi-|

So I don't think we are in a position here of

6

saying is Scott entitled to Workmens Compensation benefits,

7

and if he is, then that is his exclusive remedy.

8

35-1-62 permits, and as cited, suits to be brought under

9

other circumstances.

10

Section

Now I don't think, your Honor, that Scera could be

11

an actual employer of Scott Gourdin, for the reasons that

12

I've stated before, because the activity in which Scott was

13

involved was prescribed by the statute.

14
15

THE COURT:

Well, who's employee was

he, if he was employed by anybody?

16

MR. YOUNG:

Well, you know, I got to

17

thinking about.

18

the traditional sense.

19

Scera would have no duty to any of the volunteer workers that

20

they have invited to come.

21

are talking about really aren't volunteers in the traditional

22

sense, to whom no duty is owed.

23

are people that are asked to come and do volunteer work.

24

that's quite different than Mr. Olson in that other case.

25

He is a worker, but he's not a volunteer in
Were he a volunteer worker, then

These volunteer workers that we

THE COURT:

These are invitees.

They
So

Well, what's their obligation^

1

to an invitee?

2

MR. YOUNG:

Well, I think they would owe

3

him a duty.

4

I am grateful for.

5

owe the same duty of care as you would if you were a business

6

and invited someone on your premises.

7
8

I just received some help, your Honor, and which
And I understand that an invitee you'd

THE COURT:

Well, is that just an assump-

tion, or do you have some authority to support that?

9

MR. YOUNG:

I can find authority to sup-

10

port that.

11

Judge, I didn't bring that with me.

12

I think that can be found in the re-statement.

But, back to the point we were arguing, whether the

13

Court should grant their motion for a directed verdict, and

14

ask for -- would terminate our association here today.

15

don't think that would be appropriate, given the law.

16

I've cited another couple of cases.

I

The Bosh case,

17

found at 777 Pacific 2.d 431.

18

I've referred the Court a copy of that, too.

19

cites back to the Marathon case, and it says, as in Pate vs.

20 J Marathon Steel Company:

And I refer to page 432.

And

And the Court

"The sole question for our determina-l

21

tion is whether, assuming defendant is a statutory employer ofl

22

plaintiff under 35-1-422, can he sue for his purposes pursuant]

23

to 35-1-62, or whether defendant enjoys immunity from such

24 I suit under Section 35-1-60.

25

In Pate vs. Marathon Steel

Company we held that a worker can sue a statutory employer whd

1

has not been required to pay workmens compensation benefits,

2

and the latter does not partake of the immunity afforded by

3

Section 35-1-60."

4
5

Then it goes on to say that decision is wholly
dispositive of the identical issue raised by the court.

6

THE COURT:

Well, I don't have any troubl£

7

with that NSR concept, Mr. Young.

I think you are mischar-

8

acterizing -- theory of statutory employee.

9

other category that is excluded, in my view.

There isn't any
They are not

10

subcontractor, general contractor, independent contractor

11

or lessees or assigns, not occupying an employer-employee

12

relationship with; if they occupy anyting, it, as an employee

13

it's an employer-employee relationship.

14

I think this other section has reference to a third!

15

party employers and the -- who might under certain circum-

16

stances be on the job and have some obligation to be liable

17

for compensation.

18

contractor who negligently causes injury, something of that

19

kind.

20

tion to the question that is before us.

21

That's -- similar to an employee of anothei)-

I don't see that this section cited has any applica-

What I am concerned about is whether or not the

22

limited compensation by nature, the free admission to a

23

theater or free admission to a swimming pool, is sufficient

24

to create an employer-employee relationship.

25

anything on that point?

Do you have

1
2

MR. YOUNG:

Your Honor, may I call on

my associate, Mr. Peatross, to help me out on that question?

3

THE COURT:

Yes, you may.

4

MR. PEATROSS:

If I might back up a step,

5

your Honor, and address an earlier concern that you raised,

6

if I may.

7

I think that the Pate vs. Marathon Steel case stands for is

8

the fact that therefs a broad class of employer, and they use

9

the word, statutory employer to whom benefits are, they are

And it might not be helpful.

However, the point

10

required to pay benefits to injured employees.

11

broad category.

12

That's a

The category of those employers that enjoy immunity

13

is much narrower, to use the Court's term, and in the Pate

14

case it's a common law or, to coin my own phrase, a bona fide

15

or actual employer are the only persons that enjoy immunity.

16

The cases that I heard discussed earlier today, particularly,

17

the Alpine case was not a case of immunity.

18

of who's responsible for Workmens Compensation benefits under

19

benefits under the statute.

20

of employer, the statutory employer definition to whom im-

21

munity is not automatically granted, is very broad.

22

can look to any indicia in order to get injured people Work-

23

mens Compensation benefits, but it's on the bona fide employe^

It was a case

And the very broad definition

And you

24 J that are entitled to immunity under the '75 Amendment to 1962

25

Now, as to whether or not this young man is an

1

actual employee of Scera.

2

23, from the way I understand, that the Courtfs been here to

3

hear them here in detail, that he has no employment relation-

4

ship, actualy bona fide relationship with Scera, because

5

that relationship is per se illegal, he f s too young, he's not

6

allowed to do those kind of things.

7

First of all, a review of Chapter

THE COURT:

For one reason.

As to

-j

The trouble with that is that

8

the statute defines people who are entitled, legal or illegal\

9

employees, legal or illegal.

10

MR. PEATROSS:

Your Honor, Your Honor's

11

referring to Section 35-1-43, which in return refers back to

12

Section 42, that's the Subsection (b), and I think you have

13

to take that in connection with the actual enumerated Statutej

14

1942, or, excuse me, not 1942, Section 42.

15

section, the Subsection, second paragraph in 62 speaks, not-

16

withstanding Section 42, you have to include both those

17

sections.

18

explanation of the Supreme Court, what they are saying, what

19

that amendment says is, it doesn't matter if he's a statutory

20

employee or the statutory relationship between Scera and this

21

youngman that would require Workmen's Compensation benefits,

22

it's only an actual common law employer that enjoys immunity

23

granted in Section 60.

24
25

Even though Sub-

In other words, not, especially in light of the

THE COURT:
Scera anything other than that?

How would you characterize

1

MR. PEATROSS:

2

THE COURT:

3

How can they be anything else?

4

Than as an employer?

Yes, a common law employer.

MR. PEATROSS:

I donft see how, your

5

Honor, they can be a common.

6

ship, he's an invitee, is the way I understand the facts.

7

And had he said, hey, come out, help out, we'll give you a

8

ticket, whatever, I'm not sure of the details of that, but

9

they are not of at law employer or bona fide, in my mind, for

10

two reasons.

11

30 of Title 34, 23, excuse me, of Title 34.

12

employer a little kid.

13

and employee relationship with a seven-year-old.

14

there's salary consideration.

15

originally asked me to address.

16

he got, but I suppose that it certainly wasn't enough to meet

17

the miminum wages requirements, even a lowered one that

18

applies to teenagers or minors.

19

$3.25 an hour.

20

legal rate for actual employees that the law demands.

21

he's not an employee.

22
23
24
25

1.

They certainly have a relation-

It's illegal under the Title, the Chapter
Because it can't

They can't have a bona fide employer
And, second,]

That goes to the point Brent
I don't know how many ticket^

I understand it's less that

But they are not compensating him at the

THE COURT:

So

Where is there evidence to

that?
MR. PEATROSS:

Well, other than I'm assum-|

ing that's the testimony that's been here today, I don't know

1

how many days or nor how many hours.

2

Honor would have to make.

3

mony to that.

4

because I wasn't here.

And I assume there's been testi-

And, I'm sorry, I can't help you with that

5
6

That's a finding His

THE COURT:

Well, you are not able to

help me with it.

7

Do you have anything further, Mr. Young?

8

MR. YOUNG:

No, your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

Let me hear - - D o you have

10

anything further, Mr. Glauser?

11

MR. GLAUSER:

I do, your Honor, several

12

things.

13

just made with regard to illegality, the case of Bingham vs.

14

Lagoon Corporation, directly on point.

15

in 1985 from the Utah Supreme Court, 707 P.2d 674.

16

that case the court held specifically a minor employee injure^

17

when struck by a moving train at employer's amusement park

18

was covered by the Workmens Compensation Act and, hence, was

19

precluded from voiding her employment contract and recovering

20

against her employer in tort, independent of compensation

21

remedy,

22

ed in hazardous employment when injured.

23

the very same year that this accident happened.

24

ly on point.

25

First of all, with regard to the arguments that were

That case came down
And in

regardless of whether the minor was illegally engagThat case came out
It's direct-

There was argument without merit.

You asked for some help with regard to the compens-

1

ation, and I do have some insights for that, if the Court

2

would like them.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. GLAUSER:

Yes, I want to hear.
First of all, we are alread]

5

aware, the only thing I could find in use is what you are

6

already aware about.

7

specifically made mention that the lunch ticket was not pro-

8

vided by the school board, but had been provided RSVP, which

9

in itself implies that consideration be other than wages.

10

In the Olson decision, on page 52, they

Second of all, I would cite the Court to the

11

California case of Laeng, and that's L-a-e-n-g, vs. a Work-

12

mens Compensation board.

13

page 1, 1972 case out of California, which held that the

14

Workmens Compensation law does not require that an applicant

15

for employment be receiving actual compensation for his

16

services in order to fall within the Workmens Compensation

17

scheme.

That case is reported at 494 P.2d,

18

Second of all, I would cite the Court to the Oregon

19

decision of Buckener, B-u-c-k-e-n-e-r, vs. Kennedy, Kennedy's

20

Riding Academy.

21

1974 case out of Oregon.

22

was there apparently walking horses; she was injured when

23

she was stepped on by a horse; she was not being paid for her

24

services; she was taking the place of teenage girls who were

25

not available that day; although the court does state that

And that case if found at 526 P.2d 450, a
And that case involved a lady that

1

the day before she worked and did get $2.00,

And the court

2

specifically held that she would come under the Workmens

3

Compensation Act.

4

wage type things involved.

5

course and providing a service, and that was sufficient.

There was not actual compensation, hourly
She was there in the regular

6

I might also refer the Court, I think the statutory

7

employer references that were made are enlightening. They are

8

not enlightening for the reason that counsel suggested.

9

other words, they don't, obviously don f t apply here.

In

No one

10

is complaining Scera is a statutory employer.

11

enlightening to show that the statutory employers don f t pay

12

compensation to the people that receive those benefits.

13

actual dollar-per-dollar compensation was a requirement, they

14

wouldn't be able to recover under Workmen's Compensation.

15

And for that reason I think they are important.

16

But they are

If

Also, I think the distinction between a statutory

17

employer, your Honor, and a regular employer has been addres-

18

sed several times in several cases by the Utah Supreme Court.

19

They have consistently held that the thing that makes an

20

entity an actual employer rather than a common law employer

21

is the right to control, the right to control the actual

22

activities.

23

to give you the cites, if you feel that's important, your

24

Honor.

25

There are several cases on point.

I'd be happy

Finally, your Honor, if I could, I would proffer

1

to the Court: Mr. Nielsen is here and he would be available

2

to testify and to authenticate this document, opposing counsel]

3

has it, the document entitled Scera And You, and it was

4

approved by the Board of Directors in January of 1983.

5

in this document they talk about the compensation that's

6

received by volunteers.

7

exactly what that program is be spelled out.

8
9
10

And I think it's important that

With your permission, I would call Mr. Nielsen or
proffer this into evidence, not for the jury, but for the
Court's guidance in what was being done for volunteers.

11

THE COURT:

12
13

And

Any objection, Mr. Young?

What is the publishing date on that document?

May

I see it?

14

MR. GLAUSER:

Yes.

I have one of these

15

all ready.

16

And I think that's an exhibit to Mr. Nielsen's deposition, but

17

I could be wrong.

18

discovery.

19

It was approved by the Board in January of '83.

But I know it was produced pursuant to

MR. YOUNG:

I've not seen it before.

20

there isn't a publishing date on it.

21

minutes of the board approval, I won't object.

22
23

MR. GLAUSER:

25

If they've got the

Well, Mr. Nielsen would be

able to testify to that, your Honor.

24

THE COURT:
would you?

And

Give me that 707 Pacific,

1

THE COURT:

Well, a motion has been made

2

for a directed verdict on the basis that under the facts pre-

3

sented, that Scott Gourdin was an employee of Scera, whether

4

you characterize them as volunteers or otherwise or as an

5

employee, and that as such the remedies through which the

6

plaintiff is entitled are limited by the Workmens Compensatiorj

7

Statute,

8
9

The question of whether or not an employee arrangement exists depends on several circumstances.

And the allega

10

tion is and the proof demonstrates that Scott Gourdin was

11

himself an employee of the, of Scera; that he did on behalf

12

of Scera exercise the right of control over Scott --

13
14

MR. YOUNG:

Excuse me.

THE COURT:

Paul.

You earlier said

Scott.

15

I'm sorry.

That Paul

16

himself was a manager of the grounds that on behalf of, pur-

17

ported to exercise control over the time, place and circum-

18

stances of the work or services that were performed by Scott;

19

that Paul purported to exercise the right to hire and fire

20

employees or volunteers; that equipment was furnished by

21

Scera and was supervised and the use thereof determined by

22

Paul Gourdin.

23

And the evidence is without dispute that there was

24

some remuneration or compensation given to Scott as a conse-

25 I quence of his relationship with Scera.

Whether or not he

1

exercised that right, it appears that he did not, that he had

2

the same advantage as he would otherwise have had by reason

3

of his father's employment.

4

What I have been concerned about then is whether

5

or not the consideration is of significance.

I found some

6

cases in 153 Am Jur 2d on Workmens Compensation.

7

cases that held where an employee or volunteer receives meals

8

at the hospital cafeteria, that was held not to be sufficient.

9

Another case where there was board and room furnished, that

There are

10

that was not held to be sufficient.

11

however as to the contrary, more recent ones, which seem to

12

say that board and room is adequate.

13

There are other cases

Then the case of Barrigan vs. Workmens Comp.,

14

California case, 1987, 240 California Reporter 811, states:

15

!l

It has long been a requirement of an employment contract

16

that it be supported by consideration.

17

this principle is the rule that a person providing purely

18

gratitous voluntary service is not an employee and has not

19

entered into an employment relationship with the person

20

receiving the services for purposes of Workmens

21

Act.

22

compensation and consideration for compensation for an em-

23

ployee contract, need not be in the strict form of wages or

24

money but may take many forms.ff

25

The counterpart to

Compensation

It: also has been the rule, for the purposes of workmens

I have been referred to the case of Bingham v s .

1

Lagoon with respect to the question of whether or not employ-

2

ment contrary to law would relieve a plaintiff of the conse-

3

quences of the exclusive provisions under the Workmens Com-

4

pensation Act.

5

asserts that Shauna was illegally engaged in hazardous employ-

6

ments in violation of Section 34-23-2 and that she was there-

7

fore entitled to void her employment contract and sue the

8

employer in court."

9

of persons under 18 years of age in any hazardous occupation.

And the Court therein stated:

"Plaintiff

Section 34-23-2 prohibits employment

10

While the issue of whether Shauna was engaged in hazardous

11

employment in violation of that section at the time of her

12

accident is a question of fact, a determination that she was

13

so engaged would not assist her.

14

cases where the court required, under Section 35-1-43, as

15

then worded, "a showing that a minor was the lawfully employ-

16

ed will have become or limitations were places on the minor's

17

rights or remedies in the law;11 then cites various cases.

18

Plaintiff relies on two

"If Section 35-1043 had not been amended subsequent

19

to those cases, both Ortega and Henry would control here and

20

Shauna could maintain this tort action.

21

lature amended that Section in 1945 to define employees, as

22

among other things, minors, whether legally or illegally

23

employed, legally working for hire.

24

employment, a minor is covered by the Workmens Compensation

25

Act."

However, the legis-

Thus, despite illegal

1

I think that disposes of the argument that this

2

young man, as employed, or the relationship with Scera, was

3

a violation of the statutes referred to.

4

question of these matters may be a question of fact, a mixed

5

question of fact and law.

6

undisputed as to these items, it appears to the Court that

7

it does become a matter and a question of law for the Court

8

to decide.

9
10

Ordinarily, the

But where they are unrefuted and

MR. YOUNG:

Before the court rules, may

I call the Court's attention to one other additional argument

11

THE COURT:

You may.

12

MR. YOUNG:

If Scott did not receive

13

tickets and if he had access to the theater or to the pool

14

and so forth by virtue of his father's employment, then where

15

is the consideration for the employment relationship?

16

THE COURT:

It seems to the Court, whetheif

17

or not he exercised those in his own capacity, he would have

18

had those privileges.

19

duplicate privileges doesn't seem to the Court to be determin

20

ative.

21

ployed and if he was working on behalf of Scera, the fact

22

that he may have also had that benefit as a consequence of

23

his relationship with his father doesn't seem to the Court

24

to make any difference.

25

The fact that he may have had dual,

He had them of his own right, if in fact he was em-

I'm concerned about this case.

I've fretted about

1

it, worried about it, and realize that the consequences of

2

court taking it away from the jury is a serious thing.

3

I do believe that under the circumstances and the proof that

4

is before this court, that the Court has no alternative.

But

5

So the Court is going to grant the motion for a

6

directed verdict, on the basis that the plaintiff is pre-

7

eluded under the Workmens Compensation Act; that he would

8

recover, that his exclusive remedy is as provided in Section

9

35-1-64; and that the Scera has no liability beyond providing

10

Workmens Compensation benefits for this young man.

11

So that will be the Order of the Court.

12

You may bring the jury back in, and the Court will

13

indicate the fact that it has entered a directed verdict in

14

this matter.

15
16

(WHEREUPON, the Jury returned into the courtroom,
at 1:50 o'clock p.m.)

17

THE COURT:

The record should now show

18

that the jury has returned to the box and is presently there-

19

in.

20

Anything further at this time, counsel?

21

MR. YOUNG:

22

MR. GLAUSER:

23

-

THE COURT:

No, sir.
No, your Honor.
Ladies and Gentlemen of the

24

Jury, the Court has been involved with counsel in considering

25

legal matters and legal arguments and motions.

And a conse-
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RICHARD K. GLAUSER, #4324
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorney for Defendant SCERA
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT GOURDIN, a minor, by and
through his Guardian ad Litem,
WAYNE C. CLOSE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
]i DIRECTED VERDICT
]
;
;

SHARON'S CULTURAL EDUCATIONAL
RECREATIONAL ASSOCIATION
(SCERA), the Toro corporation,
and CUTLER'S CYCLE & MOWER,
Defendants.

]
]
]
]i Civil No. CV86-1772
]i Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the above-entitled Court on August 6th, 7th, and 8th,
1990.

A jury was impaneled, counsel gave opening statements, and

Plaintiff presented his case and rested on August 8, 1990. At
the conclusion of Plaintiff's evidence, Defendant, Sharon's
Cultural Educational Recreational Association (SCERBL) made a
Motion for Directed Verdict. The Court took the matter under

advisement while SCERA started the presentation of its evidence
in defense.
After giving all counsel of records further opportunity
to argue the matter and present additional research and evidence
to the Court, the Court granted SCERA's Motion for Directed
Verdict.
Pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court herein sets forth a brief written statement
of the grounds for its decision.

The Court finds that under the

facts presented, Scott Gourdin was an employee of SCERA, whether
characterized as a volunteer or otherwise as an employee, and
that as such, the remedies through which he is entitled to
recover are limited by the Workmen's Compensation Statute.
The question of whether or not an employee arrangement
exists depends on several circumstances.

The allegations and the

proof demonstrate that Paul Gourdin was himself an employee of
SCERA and that he was acting as the maintenance manager for the
theater grounds. On behalf of SCERA, he purported to exercise
control over the time, place and circumstances of the work or
services that were performed by Scott Gourdin.

Paul Gourdin

purported to exercise the right to hire and fire employees and
volunteers.

Equipment was furnished by SCERA and supervision

over the use of the equipment was provided by Paul Gourdin.
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The evidence is without dispute that there was some
remuneration or compensation given to Scott as a consequence of
his relationship with SCERA.

It appears to the Court that

Scott's right in his own capacity to exercise privileges afforded
to volunteer workers at SCERA was sufficient to constitute
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Based on the

foregoing, it is hereby;
ORDERED AND DECREED that a directed verdict is hereby
entered in favor of the Defendant, Sharon's Cultural Educational
Recreational Association (SCERA).

Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, costs are hereby awarded to
SCERA as the prevailing party in an amount to be determined
hereafter.
DATED this /X

day of

, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

v

HONORABLE/CUKLEN Y . CHRISTENSEN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, on the 22nd day of August, 1990, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing, to the following:
Brent D. Young
Attorney for the Plaintiff
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
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October 31, 1991

THE VALLEY TOWER, 50 WEST 300 SOUTH, SUITE 900, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
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Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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CLERK SUPRElV1E C 0 U R ,

<Re: H ^ l n p v fi»^ofUtak Civil No. 900532
)
^
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Dear Mr. Butler:
1 am writing, pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to
inform the Court of a pertinent and significant case that came to my attention after Mr.
Hesiops Bnet was tiled. The case is Johmon v. Morton ThiokoL Inc., 168 Utah Adv. Rep.
13,
P.2d
(Utah 1991) [Filed September 5, 1991].
The reason for this supplemental citation is that the Bank of Utah's Reply Brief
states at page 14:
Thus, Brehany suggests evidence of course of conduct
and oral representations are not relevant. Heslop bases
his implied-in-fuct contract claim almost exclusively on
course of conduct and/or oral representations.
In Johnson v. Morton ThiokoL Inc., however, the Utah Supreme Court clarifies that
employee manuals and bulletins are not the only sources for an implied-in-fact contract
The Majority opinion in Johmon stated:
Specifically, we have held that employee manuals and bulletins
containing policies for employee termination are legitimate
sources tor determining the apparent intentions of the parties
and tor fixing the terms ot the employment relationship.
However, we have not seen fit to limit the evidence concerning
the parties' intent to such situations.
Kl. at 15 (emphasis added). The Concurring opinion of Justices Stewart and Durham said,
"Implied contract terms may arise from statements in an employee manual or from an
employer's course of conduct" 14 at 18 (emphasis added).

I have enclosed nine (9) copies with this original letter and ask that you provide a
copy for each Justice to review. Thank you.
Very truly yours,

Ronald E. Griffin
Attorney for Ivan J. Heslop

REG/sn
Enclosures
cc:

Glenn C Hanni, Esq. &
Stuart H. Schultz, Esq.
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